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A generation ago-perhaps only yesterday-a book called "Law and
Land" would have conjured up shades of feoffor-feoffee, the statute of
Quia Emptores, or recording acts and the Torrens system. But today it
will surprise no one to learn that this book deals with planning and
zoning. The implications of this shift in attitude I leave for others to
explore.
Law and Land consists of papers by ten participants, five English and
five American, in a Brookings Institution seminar on the legal control
of land use: two essays on the relationship of land planning and individual ownership, two on the substance of the land plan-the English
development plan and the American master plan-three on procedure
and machinery of the planning process, and three on compulsory taking
of property. Professor Charles M. Haar of the Harvard Law School has
written a beginning and an end.
The first two essays and Professor Haar's Introduction provide an
historical, political, social, and philosophical setting. W. 0. Hart, Clerk
of the London County Council, writes generally of land use control in
England, and Professor Allison Dunham of the University of Chicago
Law School discusses property, planning, and liberty. Planning in
England, Mr. Hart shows, is much more comprehensive and pervading
than in the United States (one cannot change a single land-use without
planning permission) and understandably so, considering the urgent
necessity for wholesale planning caused by war damage, the longer experience with governmental controls, the smaller size of the United
Kingdom and its one central authority, the greater population pressure

and land scarcity, and the lack of constitutional inhibitions. On the other
hand, planning in England appears to be more flexible than here, for
much of what the English do through planning we do through zoning,
and the typical American zoning ordinance is a rigid document indeed.
Throughout the book one has the feeling that the English participants
did not grasp the full significance of zoning in the United States. Mr.
Hart, for instance, says that under planning control the industrialist is
told where he may manufacture, the citizen where he may live-or, at
least, where they may not manufacture or live.' This is precisely what
American zoning ordinances tell them.
Professor Dunham, proceeding in more philosophic vein, tells how
lawyer and planner have always been like Guelph and Ghibelline:
1 P. 21.
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planners show little concern for individual liberty, lawyers give scant
attention to the acute problems of urban society. Professor Dunham
places more faith in the market as a regulator 2 than planners do and,
indeed, perhaps more than experience would warrant. His criticism of
the ad hominem nature of most zoning and planning decisions is entirely justified but his message, couched as it is in an extremely complicated style, is sometimes elusive. What he calls for is a new philosophy
uniting planning, liberty, and private property; in this essay, however,
he does not purport to provide it.
Professor James B. Milner of the University of Toronto compares
the English development plan with the master plan used in the United
States. He points out the fundamental difference: the compulsory nature
and centralized control of the development plan in contrast to the
voluntary nature and localized control of the master plan. But again
the difference may be more apparent than real. The American zoning
ordinance imposes a degree of compulsion virtually as great as that of
a development plan. Whether planning by zoning ordinance is good
planning, is, of course, another question.
Desmond Heap, Comptroller and Solicitor to the Corporation of the
City of London, next writes-and lucidly, too-about development plans
promulgated under the Town and Country Planning Act of 1947 and its
sequels of 1953, 1954, and 1959. To understand the English experience
one may want to read this essay first. Among other things, Mr. Heap tells
of the boom in English land prices and the movement of population
from north to south, principally into greater London. Part of the thrust
of English planning policy is to reverse this pressure, but people, being
people, do not always fit into the scheme; there are always those who
will sacrifice privacy and space, and put up with discomfort and inconvenience, just to be near London. And so also in the United States: "New
Yorkers temperamentally do not crave comfort and convenience-if they
did they would live elsewhere." 3 It is Mr. Heap's conclusion, however,
that the development plans have come through their first decade with
considerable credit. An attempt to rebuild England on any other basis in
the postwar years, he believes, would have been mired in chaos.
Coming to matters of procedure-the individual and the machinery
of planning-we are in a realm familiar to zoning practitioners. Three
papers make up this section: one by a barrister of the Inner Temple,
F. H. B. Layfield; another by a member of the Massachusetts Bar, Lawrence A. Sullivan; and one by the Solicitor and Parliamentary Officer to
the London County Council, J. G. Barr. This is the area Mr. Layfield
2 P. 43.
3 WHrrE, HERE is NEW YORK 50 (1949).
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calls the "shop window of planning"; this is also the area that gives
zoning and planning its color, incandescence, and, all too frequently, its
bad name.
It is interesting to find a British barrister criticizing fundamental
fairness in English planning practice. The hearing (called an inquiry)
before an administrative inspector, though perhaps somewhat less of a
hog-calling contest than the average American zoning hearing, has,
according to Mr. Layfield, many of the same infirmities. With typical
British understatement he describes the atmosphere as a "climate of
opinion characterized by a distinctly casual attitude towards facts and a
surprising indifference to the distinction between fact and opinion."
To this American zoning lawyers will utter a soft "Amen."
At the next stage of planning procedure in England-the post-hearing
appeal to the Ministry of Housing and Local Government-the phenomenon of invisible government makes its appearance. New evidence and
opinions may often be placed before the Ministry and enter into the
decisions. 5 Again there are American analogues. 6 Mr. Layfield's conclusions are sober ones:
[Appellants] continue to suspect that altogether too much is arranged behind the scenes and actual personal experience on
both sides of the inquiry table very strongly suggests that this
suspicion is well founded. .

.

. Apologists for the status quo

sometimes say that these criticisms stem from a desire to see
justice done, which, they add, is impossible because planning is
founded on policy, not on considerations of justice. Leaving
aside some of the surprising implications of this approach, it is
a misconception. The affected public wants to be treated fairly
and to understand fully what is decided. Most appellants are
fair-minded people who, if the procedure is fair and the result
is explained and can be understood, will accept the outcome
7
with good grace.
For all practical purposes, the Minister's decision is final. It can be
appealed to the courts only if it was ultra vires or if proper procedures
had not been observed. But appeal is of little value. If the applicant
appeals and prevails, his only remedy is to have the decision voided.
He will then have to refile and go through the whole process again.
Mr. Sullivan's paper is a good around-the-wall discussion of American
4 P. 105.
5 Pp. 118-19.

6 Louis Hector has described this phenomenon in a different setting. See Hector,
Government by Anonymity: Who Writes Our Regulatory Opinions, 45 A.B.A.J. 1260
(1959).
7 P. 125.
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zoning administration, but Sullivan doesn't write as well as Layfield.8
He makes a fundamental point that there is a gap between zoning
theory-which the courts like to parrot-and the practices of zoning
boards and plan commissions; courts are too often mesmerized by
zoning slogans, and zoning boards too frequently fail to consider longrange social and economic objectives. Sullivan also points out the prevailing judicial ignorance of modern planning practices-e.g., mixing
large and small residential units to achieve a desirable balance.
[W]hen experimental zoning changes are put to the constitutional test, the court should confer with the planner. It cannot
perform its function without understanding what the planner
has to say.9
For a lawyer, Mr. Sullivan shows a sympathy with the planner's role
not shared by most of his brethren.
The third paper in the group, by Mr. Barr, discusses in detail certain
enforcement provisions under the English planning act, includingAmerican zoning authorites please note-the meticulous controls over
advertisements. In 1959 the act was amended to provide for an exclusive
appeal to the Ministry, which decides matters of law as well as of fact.
The advantage of eliminating duality of appeals, Mr. Barr suggests, outweighs the criticism voiced by lawyers that points of law will have to be
argued before inspectors who are generally laymen. An exclusive mode
of appeal like this, I suggest, would do much to improve the present unsatisfactory situation in many American jurisdictions, including Illinois.
In discussing proposed improvements in enforcement procedure, Mr.
Barr has unwittingly advanced a criticism, and a fundamental one, of the
typical modern comprehensive zoning ordinance.
To make such a system work, it would be necessary first to compile an all-embracing Domesday Book of existing uses and permitted uses [What else is a comprehensive zoning ordinance?]
-not only an impossible task but effectively throwing away the
flexible pattern of the 1947 act and substituting for it the rigidity
of the detailed planning schemes of the prewar legislation, whose
unworkability is already proved.10
Mr. Barr writes of another section of the act that permits the planning
authority to attach conditions to the planning permission it has granted
8 Mr. Sullivan strays far from the world of Strunk and White and Quiller-Couch:
"The need is to afford sufficient flexibility and responsiveness to community needs to
deal constructively with vicissitudinous situations.... The rule of law ... is an ellipsis
intended to suggest the primary values to which policies promulgated and enforced in
a democratic society should adhere .
P. 129.
9 P. 148.
10 P. 170.
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by means of covenants running with the land. American zoning authorities are not authorized to extract such conditions from an applicant, but
in some cases covenants restricting land uses are voluntarily offered and,
when recorded, become binding on successors in title.1
The last portion of the book contains two papers on acquisition of
land by the sovereign, preceded by an essay by David W. Craig, City
Solicitor of Pittsburgh on regulation and purchase as two ways of attaining planned land use. It has long been gospel that police power is police
power, and eminent domain is eminent domain, and never the twain
shall meet. Mr. Craig shows how, over the years, the two concepts have
overlapped and how their merger was nearly completed in Berman v.
Parker12 and in the current urban renewal programs.
The last two papers concern the law and practice of compulsory purchase in England and eminent domain in the United States. The British
system is described by R. E. Megarry, Q.C., Reader in Equity in the Inns
of Court; United States practice is discussed by David R. Levin, Deputy
Director in the Office of Right-of-Way and Location of the Bureau of
Public Roads of the Department of Commerce. The English practice
has complications that have no American counterparts: the assumption
must be made, for example, that planning permission will be granted for
the use that the acquiring authority proposes. Otherwise the tribunal
would have to engage in what Megarry calls "a process of statutory
psychoanalysis."' 3 Mr. Levin observes the trend of American courts to
broaden the items that constitute compensable damage, and he points
out that the element of "severance damages" is today the knottiest
problem.
A book like this has obvious attractions: it puts in perspective our own
struggles with those of our English cousins. Today, however, even this
may not be enough; we must know more about land use controls from
other than the Anglo-American world. 14 The differences between the
English and American systems are summarized by Professor Haar in his
Appraisal.15 More important, perhaps, are the similarities. Whether it be
a caravan park in England or a trailer camp in the United States, the
blood pressure of the community rises about the same.
This is not a how-to-do-it book and it will not help a lawyer try a
11 This practice is described in Dallstream 8: Hunt, Variations, Exceptions and
Special Uses, 1954 ILL. L.F. 213, 236-38, and criticized by Babcock, The Unhappy State
of Zoning Administration in Illinois, 26 U. CHI. L. R.v. 509, 526 (1959).
12 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
'3 P. 221.
14 Even Baron Haussman had his problems when he rebuilt Paris in the 1860's.
PiNKNEY, NAPOLEON III AND THE REBUILDING OF PARIS (1958).

15 Pp. 245-84.
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zoning case. It nevertheless belongs in libraries of lawyers and planners,
because Professor Haar's participants deal with fundamentals, and in
the United States neither planner nor lawyer has yet come to grips with
the fundamentals of land-use control. Finally, the book presents eloquently how, on both sides of the Atlantic, societies are grappling with
the problem of how best to use a scarce natural resource in the public
interest without tramping on the rights of their citizens.
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